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 The problem of the fabled denominator that used to encumber classical politi-
cal economy has made its appearance in the recent (political science) global po-
litical economy as a genie let out from a bottle by the contemporary realism and 
mercantilism, that the structure of the contemporary world will not let back in. 
The trends in the development of the globalised world cannot be reconciled with 
its globalisational politics without a clear liberating and harmonizing strategy of 
its leading national/market democracies. Without such a strategy, globalisation 
and democracy cannot be linked because they cannot find the classical common 
denominator. The mercantilist/realistic concepts of its identification cannot but 
fail since by definition they start from the pluperfect structure of the separate 
world of developed nation-states – but forget about their assumptions and the 
context – and, amazed, time and again they undermine their own efforts and the 
survival itself. The same happens with the imperial endeavours of the leading na-
tion-state: it does not manage to be both, so eventually it may well be neither.  
 The alternative scenarios of the world political and politico-economic 
development included in our project will show that the possible successful strat-
egy of globalisation and democratization (and its substitutes) have to start from 
completely novel analytical assumptions. Only one of them is formally old but 
substantially entirely new: an increasingly unavoidable planetary denominator 
whose variations enable if not entirely successful but at least viable planetary 
politics of human and democratic development. 
 Both in Croatia and abroad, the fundamental criterion of successful develop-
ments and harmonized policies will be the question: are there superfluous people, 
regions, ideas? If there are, then in no time all people, all regions and all ideas are 
going to become superfluous. 
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 Exactly thirty years ago (1973) the celebrated book by E.C. Schumacher was pub-
lished. Its unusual title and subtitle indicate the direction of the necessary change of the 
existing paradigm of the world development, as well as of the theoretical paradigm not 
solely in social sciences. As Joseph Pierce and Barbara Wood remind us (2002): Small 
is beautiful, which struck a chord in the world impressed only by size, but only as a sort 
of a memento to alternative movements and theories. However, “the research of eco-
nomics as if people were important” has gone relatively unnoticed and easily slid into 
semi-oblivion.  
 Perhaps it was simply a case of barking up a wrong tree. Namely, economic science 
from its inception at the turn of the 19th and the 20th century had to hypothetically con-
strue its own world that might be explored with the exactness of natural sciences (Mar-
shall, 1890, 1987). The fact that the conclusions arrived at in that way were used as 
guidelines for some practical public policy, albeit economic, will most probably be de-
clared by future historians of civilization as one of the miracles of the 20th century. The 
contemporary political science with its integrated political economy and public policies 
as its increasingly important branches, should be “the right tree” for Schumacher’s de-
velopmental and scientific plea provided it takes itself seriously enough and does not 
reduce its activities to the semi-fictional “pure political” world as economics did with 
the “pure economic” one (Strpić, 2000). 
 In the meantime, that already complicated world – following Schumacher’s plea – 
enormously changed and got more complicated. The monopolar globalisational pyramid 
that emerged with the disappearance of the bipolar world political structure has not 
made it more simple as might have been expected. The neoliberal faith in the metro-
politan economic golden calf has put him on the legs of clay instead of gold. It came to 
life at an inopportune moment, at the time of the longest modern stagflation crisis (un-
precedented until then; it had always been just the opposite), that began at the time of 
the appearance of Schumacher’s book. This new economic religion almost explicitly 
declared the majority of mankind if not superfluous then insignificant for the future 
thriving liberalized world. The only thing it did not establish is the moment of the final 
liberal salvation. All in its own good time. It is unusual that the increasingly integrated 
world with increasingly unimportant people and increasingly pressing problems that 
make people superfluous, at the same time has more time for solving these problems. 
Hence it is no wonder that the increasingly globalised world finds the only superficially 
paradoxically global democracy as an almost impertinent question. Democracy is in the 
domain of national governments and international political (and increasingly military) 
relations, just like the space of designing economic and political theory is the traditional 
national space. Only their applications are global. 
 
 A World that “has Time” Full of Superflous People 
 In one Zagreb daily an economist recently perfectly summarized one of the many 
stereotypes on globalisation, this time in its relation to democracy: the more globalisa-
tion, the less democracy. And vice versa. 
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 The very opposite thing has been said many times, with equal justification: 
globalisation spreads democracy worldwide. Moreover, it is said that in that respect 
there is no sense talking about transition, because the institutions of the market and de-
mocratic system have already been introduced, at least in their elementary form, in the 
states which the transitional quip referred to. The remaining problem are the countries 
with the best developed market and democracy, and the central institutions of the global 
world order as well as the tenor of their strategies and politics. Like the once again 
ideologically invented market that is presented as a new/old deus ex machina of endless 
progress1, globalisation also enjoys the image of unstoppability and inevitability. Or a 
widespread unacceptability when understood as a voluntarist callousness of the rich. Or 
an entirely new field that has to be designed between these two cornerstones 
(Hart/Prakash, 2000). 
 Do we really live in a world of quips and counter-quips with prejudices as the basis 
instead of a fundamental social science? Are all the areas of world operation really so 
anarchic (Bull, 1977, 1984) that all the options are on the table, and it is a case of “the 
mightier (and the more quick-witted) the rightier”? Has the world theoretical establish-
ment really introduced a moratorium on the production of global solutions to their 
quandaries (Spivak, 1990)? It seems that the American war in Iraq has confirmed both 
(cf. The Economist, 2003). 
 If there is a moratorium, it has been used for a theoretical multiculturalization of 
political science relying, at least nominally, on most of its founding traditions. It has 
also been used for its official structuring into several branches/sub-disciplines 
(Goodin/Klingeman, 1996).2 One of these sub-disciplines, the reanimated political econ-
omy, was recently (Lowi, 2000) pronounced to be a political science instrument for a 
vivisection of globalisation, potentially more successful than the analytical instruments 
of economic science, particularly if there is a need for a globalisation with a “more de-
mocratic” or “more human” face (Stiglitz, 2002) or for a necessary reform of world 
economic policies (Rodrik 1996), or if there is a mingling of the dominant external eco-
nomic policies within, for the time being, a utopian integral global economic policy 
(Tyson, 2002). 
 In order to become something of the kind, political economy should primarily make 
a step further in the direction of turning into a sort of an aspectual as well as a compre-
hensive political science in small (in my opinion, this goes for every other branch of 
political science, and is a criterion for deciding whether some field of political science 
research is a branch/sub-discipline or not).  
 For that purpose, like any other science, it must reconstruct its analytical instruments 
in line with the new problems it is confronted with. Until a new paradigm is designed, 
 
1 Cf. Ginsberg (1961): The Idea of Progress: A Re-evaluation, Evolution, Development, Progress. Gins-
berg gives a very erudite survey of the older literature.  
2 Political theory, political institutions, comparative politics/national politics, political economy, public 
policy/public management, political behaviour, international relations, methodology. I would add political 
history, and together with political behaviour (with its political/psychological, political/sociological and po-
litical/economic aspect) its political-communicational/media aspect. 
 
Strpić, D., A World of Superflous People: ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXIX, (2002), No. 5, pp. 76–87 79 
                                                                                                                                              
the paradigm that is sought by all like the Holy Grail – though it sometimes seems that 
even more of them prays to God it is not found – it is possible to supplement the exist-
ing instruments with the components that have been forgotten in the development of 
modern political science and contemporary political science and have consequently 
gone out of use. 
 For me, the first such component for the last 15 years has been Hobbes’ classical un-
derstanding of the commonwealth as a political/economic community (cf. Strpić, 1998). 
This interpretation has partly been reinstalled by Dahl and Lindblom (1953) and Mac-
pherson (1962), and in a broader classical context by Hirschman (1977) and Meek 
(1967). 
 The second component is the understanding of the world system developed by, more 
or less, I. Wallerstein (1974, 1980). According to him, the world system and its proc-
esses are considered to be the fundamental political/economic entity, made up of nation-
states and the world market in a productive combination with national markets.3 
 The third component is the understanding of political/economic cycles, more inte-
grated than the one offered for political cycles – through the analogy with the business 
cycles – by Huntington (1991) and supported by Alt and others.  
 And finally, there is the understanding of institutional, business and political strate-
gies of development rooted in public policy as a harmonized policy of development, an 
understanding that assumes “that people matter”, e.g. Schumacher (1973), Sen (1999) 
and now Stiglitz (2002) in economics, and earlier Lindblom and Dahl, Hirschman 
(Foxley 1986) among political scientists and political economists. 
 Combining these elements in a recently launched project “Public policy, develop-
ment and political analysis”4, I am trying to develop a model of structural politi-
cal/economic capital that might represent a common denominator for analyzing political 
and economic processes in the international and national political/economic communi-
ties; it could also be the basis for the “analysis of forms” in their various structural seg-
ments, more narrowly in political, economic, social, cultural, and other. I would say that 
a lot of research in the world is going that way (Keller/Lowi/Gendlin, 2000). 
 The globalised situation that ought to be used as the starting point by every research 
of this kind is characterized primarily by several points. First it must be emphasized that 
it is relatively sharply divided into the processes of mondialisation (an older French 
word for globalisation)5 and globalisation or into already relatively anonymous proc-
esses of technical, traffic, communicational, cultural, and partly economic linkage of the 
world society (Wallerstein) into a single though not a unified system. We might say it 
 
3 In my opinion, Wallerstein himself underestimated the significance of nation-states within the world 
system and their complementarity to the world market and the system as a whole. In this he anticipated the 
emergence of many similar and dissimilar later underestimations. Nevertheless, as often happens, his method-
ology itself corrects his hypotheses.  
4 With my colleagues Dragutin Lalović and Zdravko Petak. 
5 In France still synonymous with globalisation.  
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has been relatively successfully globalised. It is also, albeit in an entirely different way, 
divided into the globalisational processes, clearly subjectivized processes of the imple-
mentation of political and business strategies of power that wish to make use of the 
globalisational processes. This second aspect of the ongoing economic/political 
mondialisation/globalisation is understandably dubious in several ways. Apart from 
being dubious from the point of view of values/outlooks, it is controversial because of 
its rather obvious lack of success. This foundering gives rise to the efforts to implement 
it by force.  
 Globalisation as a primarily economic process is legitimized from the economic 
point of view by Smith’s arguments of the “invisible hand”, embedded in Say’s pattern 
of the “market law”. That law is quite understandable within Say’s paradigmatic con-
text, but absolutely unfeasible within the contemporary neoclassical and neoliberal 
context. At the level of the national market, Keynes (1936) already showed – by intro-
ducing the up to then ignored time as the model’s factor – that Say’s law as the founda-
tion of an economic policy whose goal is a high utilization of production factors is fea-
sible solely with the constant intervention of an active anticyclist economic policy. It 
does not matter if these interventions are not of the Keynesian but perhaps the Bu-
chanan-like liberal-constitutional type. They spread even further to the so-called politi-
cal market and – purely theoretically methodologically speaking – they form a system 
that in principle does not differ from the market of the Stalinist-CC-cum-Gosplan-type. 
Besides, the political market can be analysed only by means of the principles of the 
limited and cosmopolistic (but not perfect) competition by means of strategic games. 
 Things get clearer at the level of the world market where Say’s law cannot operate 
(in Say’s way) by definition, because apart from the time delay there are numerous 
other obstacles that cannot be theoretically globalisationally fully eliminated. The com-
petition on the world market cannot be full or perfect even theoretically.  
 Here we could counter the legitimation via a successful “invisible hand” by cyni-
cally invoking Hayek’s argument against the system of centralized planning. A central-
ized globalisational system should not be rejected primarily because it would not be ac-
ceptable as a value as an imperialist or a non-democratic one would be. Thus it must be 
challenged because it is by definition and by the strength of its own arguments – impos-
sible.  
 I would say: what a pity! But it is as it is. As much as we support it, legitimize it, 
and declare it irreversible, the globalisation as we know it today is doomed, at least 
from the perspective of the goals its proponents proclaim. This does not mean that it 
cannot be successful in some other ways. 
 According to the first element of the model (Strpić, 1996, 1998, 2001), the 
state/nation as a political community loses in the ongoing globalisational processes the 
inherent balance among its former “natural” segments. Particularly blatant is the weak-
ening of their mutual constraints, so vital for democracy. In my opinion, this is much 
less noticeable in the often mentioned vanishing of the nation-state and much more in 
the weakening of its democratizing momentum and the efficiency of its public policy. 
This is perhaps most easily verified in economic policy. Between globalisation and de-
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mocratization I think that the pattern of the existing trend of gains in the international 
decision-making is uncertain while the losses at the national level are definite.  
 According to the second element of the model, the weakening of the state-like 
character of the elements of the world system does not strengthen it as might seem; on 
the contrary, this weakens it and alters its character. It is yet not certain whether it repre-
sents the threat of a transition into some Wallerstein-like or Hart-like world empire or 
something else, but it surely is not conducive to the proclaimed goals of globalisational 
strategies and policies. Although it is theoretically possible to imagine a culturally, de-
mocratically and economicly prosperous world empire, for the time being there is not 
much that speaks in favour of it. 
 According to the third element of the model, it should be immediately pointed out – 
together with Lowi (2001) and others – that the existing globalisation has its precedents 
and is increasingly dangerously reminiscent of them, particularly of the pattern of the 
“collapse of the liberal civilization of the 19th century” as described by Polanyi (1944). 
Not only in my opinion, that pattern is further characterized by a misconceived strategic 
assessment of the then “European concert” and other levels of decision-making (as well 
as the established sciences of that time). It is not known to what extent the power of the 
then world centre rested on the power of the world periphery, and the latter was too 
weak to provide the necessary boost at the times of growth, let alone in world crises. 
Tentatively speaking, Say’s law failed at the world market, and there was no corrective 
strategic intervention at that point of the system. 
 The same can be said again because in recent years the “silence of world leaders on 
an urgent global economic policy is becoming deafening” (Tyson, 2002). USA has be-
come all too important as the economic world trail-blazer, but too frail for this leading 
mission. The economic mission cannot be made up for only in the political and military 
spheres. On the other hand, regardless of the level of their “globalisation”, the semi-pe-
ripheries and peripheries are too weak to bolster USA, a necessity in the existing world 
political/economic order. It seems there is no idea whatsoever how to strategically in-
vigorate them but only a wan hope that a deus ex machina of the globalised market will 
suffice. 
 Regardless of how paradoxical it might sound, the interests of globalisation, of the 
world centers of political power and of the world capital today can be saved only by the 
ideas that run counter to the world establishment, similar to some of those championed 
by antiglobalists, like the one by Schumacher (1973) that there are no superfluous peo-
ple, ideas, regions, and countries.  
 If the silence surrounding these ideas remains deafening, the history of the falls of 
ancient civilizations may perhaps not be repeated as a tragedy or a farce but – as Mark 
Twain would say – it is surely going to rhyme with them.  
 
 A Country that has no Time: A Croatia of Superflous People? 
 At the time when such rhymes are already echoing as an introductory punchline for 
a new steep downward slope in the world, it is important not to lead separate public 
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policies (foreign, economic, educational, scientific, transport, communicational) in an 
isolated and routine manner but in a harmonized manner, within an integral strategy of 
development and an integral implementational developmental policy. This is particu-
larly important in a small and not entirely normalized country like Croatia.  
 Together with a survey of basic public policies in Croatia it is always good and, in at 
first sight chaotic or hopeless situations even essential, to have a look at them as a 
whole. The understanding of the states or processes that are to be maintained or modi-
fied, as well as the conduct of individual policies, are going to look somewhat different 
from that angle.  
 A comprehensive understanding and management of the conduct of a community is 
an age-old idea. It might be said that this is one of the fundamental original ideas related 
to politics and the political in general. 
 The idea originates from the ancient Far-East’s and Antiquity’s Mediterranean 
perception of the community (including its relations with other communities) and its 
spiritual and ethical or theological/philosophical and political/jurisprudential grounds. 
The tenor of this idea was somewhat altered in the cameralism and the political econ-
omy of European Modernism, as well as in the related sciences of the state and later po-
litical sciences, based on the theory of the state and the theory of the society, and on the 
actual formation of nation-states and their world. But the idea itself remained. 
 This old idea was marginalized in the 1950s under the pressure of another, 
individualistically disguised, holistic idea of an exclusively liberal community that was 
(then) taken for granted but not understood, and which only tacitly precedes individual 
action and results from it; also, under the pressure of the inertia of specialized and sec-
tor-scientific and expert approaches. However, in the last two or three decades, this old 
idea has been revived in roundabout ways primarily on practical grounds since partial 
approaches in research and in everyday politics have proved lacking or at least insuffi-
cient.  
 Hence, in political and other social sciences and in specific developmental research 
as well as in the related professions, once again the importance of a comprehensive po-
litical science and a broader social science, humanistic, natural science and technical (as 
well as technical/business and managerial) understanding of the problems linked with 
public policy (and with their conceptions as primarily developmental policies) is appre-
ciated or at least accepted. Their comprehensive planning, design and management be-
come a pragmatic focus that turns out to be a necessary precondition of their efficacy. 
At first sight independently of the issues of scientific development, and more as a form 
of a more contemporary management of development, such a focus enables – or at least 
attempts – to make use of and implement all the relevant scientific and professional ad-
vances regardless of which scientific fields and disciplines or social sectors they occur in.  
 This approach is today typical for the countries with the most advanced private and 
public management, especially where this is linked with the dominant humanistic tradi-
tion in education and science and somewhere also in public debates about social prob-
lems. These are, then, the leading countries of the European and global development, 
the countries that it seems have managed to expand their time as well as their activity 
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scope, the countries that impose and use globalisational processes for a refurbished 
maintenance of their social, political and political/economic structures – for a long time 
a norm in the modern world.  
 The countries lagging in development after the world centre, in which those struc-
tures have been denormalized in relation to the centre from the outset of modernization, 
almost without an exception suffer from the denormalizational developmental crises. In-
stead in “normal” sequences (Binder, 1971; Grew, 1978), these crises have for a century 
and a half occurred in clusters from the start of the modernization of those countries and 
nowadays often even simultaneously, almost big-bang-like. A similar trend is passed on 
to the most developed countries via the processes of interregional world extemporaliza-
tion (thus making this explosive pace global), although they still have an impression of 
a slow pace, as if they had time. The relative international clout gives an impression of a 
time reserve while haste is shifted to the periphery.  
 That is why the peripheral countries are much more aware that they do not have 
time, that all changes, often quite radical, have to be carried out simultaneously and 
with a thorough grasp of the essentials and the linkage of the domestic and the world 
context of the mainstream developments and their contextualized segments. 
 In those countries, a harmonized management of “sector” policies together with a 
full awareness that their developmental infrastructures of operation are contained in the 
others (Strpić, 1988) – which at another level also applies to sciences and occupations – 
is unfortunately more of an imperative that a real trend. The gap between the real and 
the perceived needs of the moment is here chronically acute. 
 Since it seems (with good reason) that almost everything ought to be changed, the 
relevant political protagonists easily draw a conclusion that in that case – paradoxically 
– nothing crucial can and consequently should be changed. On the one hand “it is 
known” that all “historical” changes have been carried out so that only lesser develop-
mental adjustments are needed, the adjustments that seem important and urgent solely to 
an unhistorical and unqualified, even an attitudinally unsympathetic eye. From the per-
spective of everyday politics and frequently of the media, the obvious general lack of 
time is seen as its actual non-existence and is to a certain extent modified when it obvi-
ously has to or can be, but only in the existential politics and not in the public policies. 
The Croatian syndrome of party alternation and constitutional changes instead of and 
not parallelly to some radical public policy interventions is a sad example, but only in-
dicative of the general malaise.  
 Due to this lack of time, politics (and its media: show must go on) care only about 
politics. And money, naturally, if tied to politics. But as somebody said a long time ago, 
this is the money of politics. It is the money of the political exchange, and not of the ex-
change of commodities or services, of the private and the public exchange. Politics is 
perceived as the foundations of a community and not vice versa as might be expected 
from a more vital perspective; from this marginally normalized perspective, however, 
such an expectation would not be “normal”. This kind of politics – in one version – first 
“gave” us a state, and then – in the other – freed us from the suffocating embrace of “the 
fathers of the nation”. That is why it has earned its money (both times, and it could do it 
again). 
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 The contemporary social-democratic and social-liberal notion of a kind of a moder-
ated laissez-faire (originally established in the conditions of a high utilization of all pro-
duction factors) is interpreted within this denormalized derived rural syndrome as an as-
sumption that one should primarily till the political field, while the money ought to be 
provided by the meadow of the production of goods and services. Politics is here only to 
financially mow, and not to worry how to produce (or to provide the necessary infra-
structure for the production since in itself it is such a super-structural infrastructure). It 
is interesting to note how this syndrome has been maintained for decades in this region, 
even centuries in a broader sense, and how it perfectly corresponds to our centuries-old 
despotic, dictatorial and authoritarian political culture (and structure). Its harmonization 
constantly makes up for the harmonization of the real developmental management of 
public policies. That is why public policies in Croatia can only be routinely adminis-
tered without the allegedly expected developmental results – as long as they aliment the 
needs of the government, since fulfilling those needs and their only periodical legitima-
tion before voters is the only genuine or at least primary goal of these policies as the 
classical state ones.  
 Namely, in the last two decades Croatia has gone through three post-realsocialist 
systems with an array of accelerated extensive constitutional, ideological, and politi-
cal/party changes, no less significant than the recently recognized state independence. It 
is indicative that the perception and management of public policies have been the most 
difficult to change to the extent that this inertia might very soon undermine the gains of 
the other, seemingly more basic changes, and even threaten the survival of the existing 
Croatia, not only in Croatia. The latter leads to the former.  
 At biggest risk are two fundamental but most neglected (and soon perhaps the only) 
Croatian resources: the human and the social capital. If soon there is no reversal in the 
social/developmental direction in the public policy management, Croatia will indeed not 
be able to normalize its mid-term or long-term development. 
 At best, if we maintain this course, we might become EU’s welfare case, tolerated 
for security reasons. The question is how long the statehood rationale of a nation may 
be based on that. The Croatian statehood rationale must be directed at the revitalization 
of our own resources and the best national and European values and the development 
based on them in as favourable international setting as possible. It cannot rely exclu-
sively on that setting and its mix with the domestic balances of politicking magnetic 
forces, just as it could not have survived for long on the calculated politicking conflict 
with that setting with a domestic equilibrium in mind.  
 As everywhere else in the world of the new century, but even much more drastically 
so in Croatia, the fundamental criterion of a fruitful developmental outlook will be the 
question: are there, in the established perspective of development, any superfluous peo-
ple, regions and ideas? If there are, then in Croatia soon everybody is going to be super-
fluous; hence Croatia itself will become superfluous. 
 Until now, Croatian development has been based on the superfluousness of people, 
regions, and ideas.  
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 Croatia was formed on the territory similar to today’s territory by means of a forced 
cession of fractions of its people and lands during the Frankish, then the Venetian and 
finally the Ottoman conquests, and later by a more or less forced acquiescence to the 
protected but also peripheral position in the different variants of the Hapsburg Monar-
chy with a plethora of superfluous people and ideas and with an extremely one-dimen-
sional and one-sided structure and infrastructure of development.  
 The failed society, the failed capitalism, the failed democracy, and the failed 
multinational and unitary union of the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (later 
the short-lived Yugoslav Kingdom) collapsed under the burden of the same syndrome. 
Something similar (under different sobriquets) happened to the second Yugoslavia, 
though it laid the foundations of today’s national independence. It would not be good 
that something similar happens to the first independent Croatia as a republic.  
 The primitive accumulation of capital and its party state that I diagnosed and wrote 
about twenty years ago (Strpić 1983) still has us all in its lethal embrace in the post-re-
alsocialist way. Not as firmly and as neo-stalinistically as several years ago or two dec-
ades ago, but (devastated more by the war and the revolutionary primitivization than 
physically ravaged and slaughtered) we are much weaker today and these not so pitiless 
pliers are nevertheless much more unbearable despite its beguiling pretensions.  
 Without a swift and a radical reversal in the basic idea of the policy of utilization of 
all Croatian resources – primarily human, natural and social – without a clear entrepre-
neurial, scientific and professional setting in which a belated development would be set 
in motion (together with the immediately efficient human and developmental solidarity) 
it will not be possible to break this relatively increasingly precipitous national deadlock. 
The public policies, however, rather inertly and surprisingly synchronously mostly go 
on pursuing the opposite course.  
 I am afraid that the spectre of Mark Twain haunting the world might call on us. And 
take up its permanent residence in Croatia. 
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